Humanitarian transition in Ivory Coast: actors' ideologies and practices put to the test by local demand

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Centre Suisse de Recherches
Scientifiques en Côte d'Ivoire

Les Papiers du Fonds #3

January 2016

With the support of

To reference this article:

ADOU Djané dit Fatogoma "Humanitarian transition in Ivory Coast: actors' ideologies and practices put to the test by local demand", Fonds Croix-Rouge française, *Les Papiers du Fonds*, no. 3, January 2016, pp. 17.

Summary

Ivory Coast has been gradually emerging from over a decade of political and military conflict, whose consequences for the population triggered the intervention of national and international actors from the humanitarian field. However, differing interpretations of the modes and sequences of this humanitarian intervention, with its social and political stakes, has meant that the actors are out of sync. This differing interpretation between actors regarding the permanency of the intervention's catalyst event calls into question the ideological basis for humanitarian retreat, in the context of the debate surrounding the ethics and modes of humanitarian transition. Based on the case of the western Ivory Coast, this paper proposes an analysis of the forms of justification of entry and retreat from the humanitarian field. The goal is to examine how these forms of justification are reinvested, the stakes of the resulting practices, and their relation to the question of humanitarian transition. It emerges that the fear of creating humanitarian dependency in Ivory Coast, presented as an exit ideology for international actors, is in fact a resource which maintains this dependency.

Keywords: Ivory Coast, humanitarian action, ideology, transition

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Introduction

Ivory Coast has been gradually emerging from over a decade of political and military conflict, whose consequences for the population provoked a humanitarian response. Indeed, after the death in 1993 of the country's first president, who had been in power since 1960, the political tensions linked to his succession took a military turn with a coup d'état in 1999. In 2002, another attempted coup d'état degenerated into an armed conflict which occupied the north of the country until 2011. The political arrangements for the resolution of this conflict led to a war between December 2010 and April 2011, after the presidential election held in response to the crisis. This other sequence of conflict, according to the national investigation committee, led to 3000 deaths, numerous displacements and a massive destruction of private and public property (National Commission of Inquiry, 2012). This context of military conflict since 2002, and its consequences for the population, associated with the State structure's "incapacity" to cope with said conflict, triggered the intervention of national and international actors from the humanitarian field.

Humanitarian action has a polysemous character, simultaneously referring to international humanitarian law, charitable action, and even actions linked to the social and solidarity-based economy (Laville, 2001). Consequently, it appears important to clarify what is meant by it here. According to Brauman, "humanitarian action is that which aims, without discrimination and through peaceful means, to preserve life in respect of dignity, and to restore to man his capacity for choice" (Brauman, 1994: 4). It is rendered visible through its goal, which is to provide assistance to people in distress, allowing them to take their destiny back in hand, to overcome their despair and to rebuild a new life (Schroeder et al., 2005). For the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), "humanitarian actions are based on four essential principles which are: universality (addressing itself to all the victims in the world), impartiality (whatever their affiliations), independence (not subjected to external directives), and neutrality (without political consideration)" (Pasquier, 2001, quoted by Raymond et al., 2005: 7).

Humanitarian aid consequently appears as a social construction which evolves in a particular relational framework, rendered visible by singular practices and legitimated by ideological foundations. All this in a context of "crisis" with a catalyst that may be a natural disaster, or especially war, as in the case of Ivory Coast.

In this regard, humanitarian aid can take diverse forms in its practical application, such as donations of money with its variants such as *Cash Transfer* (Alagbe, 2013), provision of supplies and emergency equipment, deployment of personnel specialised in interventions, or reinforcement of local actors' capacities. As a relation, humanitarian aid brings together several levels of actors which can broadly be split into promoters and beneficiaries, within a normative framework based on altruism (Andreoni, 2006). This aid can come from diverse sources, such as state and non-state actors, international public organisations or individual actors. Ideologically, humanitarian aid is intended to

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be apolitical and neutral, an unconditional and impartial assistance for people in distress, provided without social, political or cultural discrimination (see for example the seven humanitarian principles of the Red Cross Movement). In reality, the boundaries between humanitarian aid, development, human rights struggles and peace promotion are not clear, which contributes to the humanitarian renewal dynamic (Pérez de Armiño, 2002; EuropeAid, 2008; Voice – Concord, 2012).

In fact, humanitarian transition involves at least two levels of understanding which dialectically influence each other, namely the institutional and operational levels. On the one hand, the institutional level as the transformation of humanitarianism (Pérez de Armiño, 2002; Mattei, 2014) as an institution, and on the other, a sequential level with concepts of gradualism, continuum, contiguum and reference to the transition from a so-called emergency phase to a phase of empowerment for target groups in distress (Macrae et al., 2004; Voice-Concord, 2012). However, in Ivory Coast, one can observe a certain lack of sync and a differentiated interpretation on behalf of the actors concerning the modes and sequences of this humanitarian intervention, with its social, political and economic stakes.

Indeed, the deployment of humanitarian aid in Ivory Coast following the military and political crisis, and especially the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011, reveals a break and a differentiated interpretation between actors regarding the phases of emergency, transition, and the resumption of development.

"Dear humanitarian friends, we still need you! Don't leave!..." (Minister for Solidarity)[1].

At the local level, the beneficiaries at the end of the line are the "vulnerable people in distress", who along with the local implementation actors, fall back into precariousness when the professionals retreat.

"Look at us, since we got back from the camps! They tell us to put down our weapons and integrate this project of making artisanal soap. We did the training, the premises are there and in two years nothing has evolved, everything is stopped! It's not a call to put down arms but to take them up again!" (Ex-combatant)[2]

"This is where we put the pupils whose parents have been displaced due to the crisis and who have a school-age problem. It's part of the academic bridge programme with NRC. But the project has stopped already. It was a good thing but we've stopped it now, whilst children continue to come back to the village..."

(Principal of the Toa Zoé primary school in Duékoué)

This differentiated interpretation between actors regarding the permanency of the intervention's catalyst event calls into question the ideological basis for humanitarian retreat, in the context of the debate surrounding the ethics and modes of humanitarian transition3.

The concept of ideology is included here in its social-anthropological sense, through social representations, values, beliefs, and myths which have the function to mobilise, legitimate, naturalise

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[1] Formal address by the Minister for Solidarity, the Family, Women and Children during Humanitarian Day on September 9th 2014 at CERAP, in Abidjan, who appealed for international organisations to stay active in the field.

[2] Interview with the person in charge of young girls who had returned to the crossroads neighbourhood of Duékoué in the western Ivory Coast, March 2nd 2015.

[3] In the context of the global forum Convergences, the French Red Cross Fund organised a conference to open the debate surrounding "Principles, values, ethics: which guides for humanitarian action?"

or even mask the true nature of social relations (Mannheim, 1956; Boudon and Baurricaud, 1994; Hours, 1998; Gnabeli and Lognon, 2010). It appears here in the ideas voiced by actors to justify their retreat or ongoing presence in the field.

The objective of this article is to present the configurations and logics surrounding the retreat of humanitarian actors in Ivory Coast, after noting the small number of studies in this field (Floridi and Verdecchia, 2010)[4]. It's a question of seeing how humanitarian action appears at the local level, and for which configurations of actors. What are the ideological referents for the retreat of these actors, for which humanitarian transition in Ivory Coast?

Based on the experience of the western Ivory Coast, this paper proposes an analysis of the different social resources, and particularly of the forms of justification of entry and retreat from the humanitarian field. The goal is to examine how these forms of justification are reinvested, the stakes of the resulting practices, and their relation to the question of humanitarian transition.

Methodology

The study focused on the western Ivory Coast, which was much more affected by the crisis, and which has a high concentration of international aid. This zone provides relevant indicators about the manner in which humanitarian actors in Ivory Coast set themselves up in the emergency phase, and their implication in the transition and development phases. It allows us to take a look at the structuring of the actors, their interactions, their areas of intervention and the ideological resources brought into play prior to their retreat. Inside of this western region, the Guiglo - Duékoué - Man triangle was chosen as the site for data collection for practical reasons.

This study is based on theoretical and methodological knowledge from the sociology of organisations and from the social anthropology of social interventions (Lavigne Delvigne, 2011; Reverdy, 2013). It follows a qualitative approach which essentially consists of interviews with relevant actors of aid and humanitarian action in Ivory Coast, observation and documentary research.

Research in these small localities allowed for a more advanced study of the actors on a small scale. The research focused on the micro-local level, which is to say the concrete implementation of humanitarian action in the field, which involves traditional and religious community actors alongside NGOs and other macro-sociological actors. For example, in Duékoué, we met important religious actors - such as Father Cyprien from the Duékoué Catholic mission, who played a central role in the 2011 crisis - beneficiaries, local NGOs, local authorities, ex-combatants, representatives of the United Nations system such as OCHA, the HCR, the UNOCI, etc. A form of triangulation was carried out through visits and meetings in Danané and Zouan-Hounien, neighbouring localities which have been strongly affected by the political crisis in Ivory Coast since 2002 and long before, with the humanitarian consequences of the Liberian and Sierra-Leonean conflicts.

Research activities were carried out in the following order: first, a cartography of humanitarian action in Ivory Coast, then a cartography of the actors (sponsors and beneficiaries) of humanitarian

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[4] Floridi and Verdeccha, in their study about Ivorian civil society capacities in general, observed that "no studies or research have been produced on the subject in the last decades" (2010: 3), and this reinforces our observation regarding the specific question of the humanitarian action dynamic in the country.

action, and finally, a collection of secondary data concerning the governance of its organisations. The empirical phase of data collection took place between September 2014 and August 2015.

Results

Sponsors: between a preference for emergency and an over-investment in certain sectors

Humanitarian action in Ivory Coast generally invests in six classic target areas: water (hygiene and sanitation), education, protection, health, food security, and shelter/non-food goods. Humanitarian professionals follow the preferences of sponsors in investing in these different domains. Each sponsor follows their own criteria for financing in these areas. For example, the Netherlands have a preference for WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene).

The health sector represents more than 90% of USAID activities and essentially concerns the fight against HIV/AIDS. Since 2003, USAID has dedicated 140.000.000 dollars in two parts of 50% to the *President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief* (PEPFAR) and to the *Center for Disease Control* (CDC). The remaining 10% of USAID since 2011 has concerned the sectors of democracy and governance, with the programmes Transition Initiative 1 and 2 (Ivory Coast Transition Initiative 1 and Ivory Coast Transition Initiative 2). This programme aims to identify the mechanisms allowing for the prevention and management of conflicts, especially in the western Ivory Coast and particularly in Duékoué, as well as "at risk" social categories such as youths, transporters, ex-combatants, etc. Alongside this initiative, USAID as a sponsor grants 5 million US dollars to the World Food Programme (WFP) at the UN level.

For the Norwegian Refugee Council[5], the focus is on education in emergency settings, food security, ICLA (Information, Counselling, Legal Assistance) in a collaborative management strategy for conflicts, and WASH (Water, Sanitation and Hygiene). Education in emergency settings includes training for teachers and the reintegration of displaced children who left the education system due to the war, with the implementation of academic bridge programmes.

A look at the emergency phase of 2011-2012 shows that the domain of early recovery did not receive financing, whereas food security, shelter/non-food goods, and education were financed up to 50%. Furthermore, only the big international NGOs and UN agencies were able to obtain the required funding on the basis of consolidated appeals. This funding ranged from more than 100% for IOM, 93% for UNICEF, 63% for the WFP and 39% for the FAO for the UN agencies. For international NGOs, the IRC was financed to 73%, 68% for NRC, 42% for DRC, 37% for ACF, and 31% for ACTED (OCHA 2012).

It is the sponsors who choose the priority sectors of intervention for humanitarians, yet it can be observed that there is an over-investment in emergency aid and in certain sectors such as health, to the detriment of other important sectors, especially with a view to a durable exit from the emergency situation in the long term. Though this aid can allow a way out of an emergency, it does not foster a transition towards empowerment for local populations.

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[5] Interview with M. Cheik BA, country representative for NRC, 08/05/2015.

Humanitarian funding in Ivory Coast: the sponsors' prioritisation of   international NGOs

Overall, there are three levels of actors' structuring according to the circulation of financial and logistical capital. There are therefore firstly the sponsors, who possess the financial capital, secondly the professionals and their delegations, as well as their implementation partners who have the savoir-faire, and thirdly, the local communities or people in distress who are supposed to benefit from these actions.

At the meso level, it appears that there is a privileged partnership between NGOs and sponsors of the same nationality. This is due to certain barriers like knowledge and experience of procedures as well as the normative frameworks within which the sponsors' activities take place. This relational model is well illustrated by ECHO or USAID. USAID privileges American NGOs because of their cultural affinities as well as facilitated procedures.

> *"We can only finance international NGOs, which have very strict procedures and whom we can depend upon for results. We cannot do otherwise..." (ECHO office head, Ivory Coast)[6].*

> *"The mechanisms of calls for bids or direct choice are used to choose these international NGOs. At the NGO level, there is the relation by call for bids and the relation by direct choice. The relation by call for bids follows the procedure of American law about competition on the public market" (Country Director, USAID)[7]*

The sector of predilection for the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO) was food security, with as principal partners the WFP, the FAO, and the Ivorian government. Since the outbreak of violence at the end of 2010, the European Union has allocated 119.7 million Euros in humanitarian aid, targeting the populations who were most affected by the conflict. Up until June 30th, 2011, this aid was used to cover needs in matters of health, food, shelter, protection, water and sanitation during emergency operations[8]. Today, humanitarian aid is deployed in the framework of a "partnership for transition" centred on the improvement of food security, access to basic healthcare, and the promotion of cohesion for social categories considered to be the most vulnerable. This partnership aims to give enough time to the government and donors of development aid to reestablish State structures and resume public services, especially in regions affected by the conflict. In the context of the partnership "for transition", ECHO has six partners with two key areas which are health and cross-border protection. For health, the executive partners are the French Red Cross, *Terre des Hommes* and the International Rescue Committee (IRC). The Norwegian NRC and Danish DRC are the executive partners for cross-border protection through the management of land disputes.

As for USAID, and the European Union procedures for ECHO, the selection is very often preceded by "Calls for expressions of interest" relative to a particular area which is included in the sponsor's domain of interest.

With USAID, for example, direct response is allowed in two forms. The first is linked to the amount allocated, which must be less than 150.000 US dollars and concerning an emergency action which will be authorised and justified *a posteriori*. The second form of direct action without a call for bids concerns donations for international NGOs recognised as public utilities and registered as such on an

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[6] Interview with the person in charge of young girls who had returned to the crossroads neighbourhood of Duékoué in the western Ivory Coast, March 2nd 2015.
[7] Country director for USAID, interviewed on June 8th 2015, US Embassy, Abidjan.
[8] For more details, see: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/where/sub-saharan-africa/ivory-coast_fr

existing list, PIOs[9] (*Public International Organisations*). This is the case, for example, of CICR and specialised UN agencies. In this regard, the selection of these international NGOs depends on their registered presence in a network through prior authorisation. This recognition is a resource for professional humanitarians, and its upkeep orientates their partnerships with local NGOs.

There is a formal relation based on contracts or conventions between sponsors and professional international humanitarians, which bases its legitimacy on experiences, supranational organisational structures, methods of functioning, privileged relations between public and/or private donors from their home country, etc.

In short, international sponsors prioritise funding for Western international NGOs. Local organisations are short-sightedly excluded from applying for this emergency aid, which therefore does not allow for a rapid reactivation of emergency aid, if necessary, by local humanitarian actors.

Local NGOs: strategic emergence faced with the crisis and subcontracting of international NGO activities

The military and political conflict produced a market for humanitarianism in Ivory Coast, with a "boom" of associations linked to emergency humanitarianism.

> *"After the outbreak of the crisis, from October 2002 to September 30th 2003, in less than a year, 521 civil society organisations were declared, whilst between 1952 to the 19th of September 2002, declared civil society organisations only numbered 595. Most of these organisations emerge and operate in the humanitarian field [...] in the logic of emergency and know only the operational mode of service provision, often through asymmetrical relations of subcontracting with international NGOs" (Floridi and Verdecchia, 2010: 10).*

These local organisations disappear or go into hibernation when the emergency subsides or when international NGOs deactivate their interventions. For this reason, the local NGOs that were still active in the humanitarian field at the moment of the study in Duékoué and Man were formalised (headquarters, declaration receipt, organisation chart, bank account, logo...) at the end of the "emergency phase" in 2013. Aside from a few national NGOs (with headquarters in Abidjan), who have a relatively lasting collaboration with UN agencies, the others have difficulty maintaining an organisational structure and practices which are compatible with the sponsors' requirements of transparency and performance.

> *"It was in 2010 that the NGO took off, with the refugees from Duékoué who arrived in Man. Once the UNICEF antenna in Duékoué gave us 40,000 FCFA. In 2012, Save the Children contacted us about its Literacy and Academic Bridge Class project. The volunteering with Save structured the thing with a grant for 500.000 FCFA. Afterwards, the project was renewed with 2.000.0000 FCFA. I didn't know how to write a report. So I called the young people you see here to help me. OCHA helped me too, by giving advice. I declared the association, we found the headquarters, well! We're advancing little by little..."[10]*

Local NGOs, created in response to the political crisis and its negative effects, seek to formalise themselves through a legal existence based on the law of 1960 concerning associations, experience with international NGOs, staff expertise, headquarters and a minimum of logistics.

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[9] For the details of these organisations, see: http://www.state.gov/p/io/empl/126305.htm

[10] Interview with the president of ADPF, in Man, March 5th 2015.

These local NGOs are most often put in place by "volunteers" who have worked for international NGOs during the implementation of a short-term project. At the end of this project, the volunteers transform themselves into social entrepreneurs by the implementation of such a structure. This was the case for the local NGO *Sport Paix et Développement* in Duékoué whose founder (a sports teacher from a private establishment) created the NGO after having participated in the implementation of short projects of the Swiss overseas development programme in the field of "sport and social cohesion", with UNICEF in 2007 and during the post-electoral crisis of 2010-2011, with Save the Children from 2011 to 2012, and with NRC from 2012 to 2015 as part of their project "Bridge classes for transition".

> *"But the funding is not direct, these are subcontracts. For that we were asked to have an advisory board, an accounts department, a project department, etc." (SPD President).*

More specifically, the action of local NGOs often amounts to subcontracting for international NGOs. Their emergence and lifespan are therefore strongly linked to the context of humanitarian crises, on the one hand, and to the amount of time spent by international NGOs in the field on the other. They disappear or go into hibernation when the crisis recedes or when international NGOs cease their interventions. This situation of local NGOs, at the temporary service of international NGOs, does not encourage the emergence of sustainable local organisations, nor the transmission of skills for their benefit. As a result, it does not reinforce the credibility and legitimacy of local NGOs as far as sponsors are concerned.

A recent, marginal attempt to transfer skills to local NGOs

International NGOs proceed by direct intervention by recruiting a workforce and individual skills, or by indirect intervention by soliciting a subcontracted staff from local NGOs. Local NGO intervention in the humanitarian field is a very recent phenomenon, generally stemming from a strategic response to a humanitarian emergency linked to the military and political crisis. The mobilisation of local NGOs is undertaken through calls for bids and services, calls for expressions of interest, the activation of networks by the NGO leader, or in a spontaneous way due to their proximity with the targets. These local NGOs generally function through "improvisation" and tend not to be conversant with the principles of international humanitarian aid.

> *"During the post-electoral crisis, with the massive arrival of displaced people here in the mission, we did what we could with the help of the associations that were here. For almost two weeks, there were more than 30.000 people in this small space that you see. People did everything here, standing up, pressed up against each other, until the international NGOs took over, by creating camps. Well at the moment, there are three that are here, which is to say the NGO Bonne Action, Sport et Paix and, uh..." (Father Cyprien, Catholic mission in Duekoué)*

For example, it was only in June 2014 that local NGOs working in the departments of Man, Duékoué and Guiglo (which is to say, in the zone where humanitarian action is the most concentrated in Ivory Coast) benefited from initiatory "training" in humanitarianism by Man's OCHA delegation, as part of the general capacity-reinforcement of civil society by the European Union[11]. With this

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[11] A project for the reinforcement of civil society's capacities in a general manner by the European Union.

objective in mind, NRC[12] for example decided to train local NGOs in western Ivory Coast with a view to reinforcing their operational capacities. Thus, 7 local NGOs were selected. The focus areas of the training were management, the fight against corruption, fundraising, partnerships for implementation, etc. Following this training, 3 NGOs were selected as implementation partners, on the basis of their skills, logistics management, and management capacities, according to an organisational structure which allowed for a degree of transparency.

> *"Out of the 3 NGOs selected, 2 are proving satisfactory: ADPF and Sport Paix et Développement. The third, GFM3, is more problematic. Its headquarters are in Abidjan and the coordination chain for activities is not correctly implemented, work is lagging behind schedule" (NRC Country representative)*

This training of local NGOs aims, to a degree, to make them more competent subcontractors. The training covers specific technical skills, and so does not seem to contribute to the project of empowerment for local NGOs. It is not a sign of a real movement towards "humanitarian transition" through the reinforcement of local actors' autonomy. Of course, it is too soon to evaluate the effects, and we cannot yet say whether it is a real movement which will lead to "humanitarian transition" by making local NGOs autonomous from international NGOs, or if it is just a means of ensuring that these local NGOs acquire just enough skills to carry out subcontracting tasks.

Overestimating the State's capacity to take over

The emergency phase is generally characterised by the breakdown or absence of state capacities to manage the distress and peril of categories of the population throughout or in parts of the country. This breakdown leads to the substitution of state services by non-state actors, namely humanitarian professionals. In this regard, the exit from the emergency phase is linked to an interpretation of the state's capacity to take over its sovereign role as administrator of public services. At the end of 2014, more than 2 years after the beginning of the transition phase, several elements of distress in these zones was still visible. For example, the rehabilitation of displaced people's huts, internal and external, was stopped, there was insufficient access to water due to the delay in restarting agricultural activities, a lack of drinking water and electricity due to destruction, a large number of ex-combatants and at-risk youths, as well as difficulties in other domains of intervention. Faced with these difficulties, and the risk of relapse that they represented, humanitarian professionals deactivated most of their projects in 2014. Whilst in 2011 there were 113 in the consolidated appeal process (CAP), there were only 20 international NGOs in 2014 (OCHA, 2015). This creates a feeling of abandonment for the targets in distress, like the victims of the post-electoral crisis in Duékoué.

> *"You see, our huts have been destroyed for the most part. When we came back from the camps, the people from Solidarités came to help a bit and then they left. PAPC came too, but they came and gave you a few sheets of metal, they asked you to make bricks. They said that's your contribution. But imagine someone coming back from a camp, what do they have? And those who got out, it's now, they're coming little by little. Solidarités helped us to fix up the rice field. The Red Cross looked after us too, but it didn't last..."*

In fact, the deactivation of emergency projects follows comparators of post-conflict socio-political normalisation. There is namely the issue of improving the security situation which refers here to the

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[12] Interview with M. Cheik BA, country representative for NRC, 08/05/2015.

reduction of armed incidents between the regular army and the parallel armed groups. Indeed, after the official end of the post-electoral crisis in May 2011, targeted attacks against positions of the Republican Forces of Ivory Coast (FRCI)[13], namely in the west of the country on the Liberian border, against barracks in Abidjan and other localities in the south, continued to punctuate the process of exiting from the crisis. The reduction of such incidents constituted one of the justifications for the humanitarians' retreat.

Furthermore, there were the grounds of the "economic growth" characterised by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as announced by the government, which went from -4.4% in 2011 to 10.7% in 2012 and 9.5% in 2015[14]. Such announcements lead one to believe that the State is back to full capacity to face the "residual" needs of the target groups of humanitarian aid, even though this growth in figures doesn't translate easily to the daily experience of the population.

The "fear" of humanitarian dependency: a logic which maintains dependency

What may appear as a rush to leave the Ivorian humanitarian field is supported by an ideology of avoiding the creation of a form of humanitarian dependency.

Indeed, one of the arguments advanced by emergency aid workers, and other professionals of classical humanitarianism (see for example Pérez de Armiño, 2002, on classical humanitarianism and humanitarian revival) to justify their retreat is the "fear" of creating humanitarian dependency in the social body and particularly in the target groups, so that the projects are characterised by their brevity.

"We do not want to replace the State, and we not want to create humanitarian dependency amongst the population". (This argument comes up amongst leaders of international NGOs and sponsors met during the study: FICR, NRC, OCHA, USAID, and ECHO …)

But local actors, namely local NGOs based in these humanitarian zones, are unable to consolidate a local autonomy and appropriation. The transition between the use of their staff during the emergency phase by international organisations, and their positioning as actors of recovery consolidating the knowledge drawn from these emergencies, remains problematic. The situation of these local actors calls into question the indicators of the emergency, transition, and development phases which compartmentalise the deployment of humanitarian actors in a country like Ivory Coast. After the retreat of these international NGOs, the instability in terms of national capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies or development remains intact (which is in accordance with reservations about Cash Transfers in the emergency humanitarianism of Alagbe, 2013).

Relations between international NGOs and the State are also limited in that the assessment made by international NGOs of the State's renewed capacity to assume its sovereign role of administrator of public services (post-conflict socio-political normalisation), functions as a signal announcing the end of their intervention and the hand-over to local authorities. At this level, it really is still just a hand-over. As long as the State is unable to act, international NGOs act, and as soon as the State is

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[13] Name of the army which supported the Ouattara camp against the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) of the Gbagbo camp during the post-electoral crisis in 2010-2011.
[14] Cf. www.bilan2011-2015.gouv.ci

considered capable of action, the international NGOs stop acting. There is no common action with a view to a humanitarian transition.

In fact, based on the observations in Ivory Coast, "humanitarian transition" appears only to exist in an ideological form. Aside from the assessment of a return to post-conflict socio-political normalisation, the deactivation of emergency projects by international NGOs appears to result from their concern and fear of creating a form of humanitarian dependency. This refusal to create a dependency indeed echoes the ethics of humanitarian transition (Mattei, 2014), inasmuch as it is accompanied by a concern with empowering local humanitarian actors precisely in order to avoid rendering them dependent on international NGOs. Yet this concern with empowerment is in fact only recently and slightly observable (training for the reinforcement of technical capacities of certain local NGOs at the end of December 2014 in western Ivory Coast, and the NRC initiative for 7 NGOs). We can therefore question the sincerity of this argument (concern and fear of creating dependency) to justify retreat, since it appears that it is the retreat in itself that fuels the dependency of local NGOs and populations regarding international NGOs. Disengaged as soon as the emergency situation is over, international NGOs give way to local actors who are incapable of ensuring local autonomy and appropriation.

It seems contradictory to justify a retreat by a fear of creating dependency when almost nothing is done to make these local NGOs autonomous and capable of facing the advent of new crises. There is a paradox between a concern and fear of creating humanitarian dependency, and a relation whose very functioning itself creates humanitarian dependency.

Conclusion

This study allowed for the underlining of the dynamics of humanitarian action in Ivory Coast, with an emphasis on the west of the country, which has had the greatest concentration of international aid for many years. In general, there appear three levels of structuring of actors according to the circulation of financial and logistical capital, namely the sponsors, the professionals, and the local communities or people in distress who are supposed to benefit from these actions. To choose the international NGOs, the mechanisms of calls for bids or direct choice are put into place according to the sponsors' instructions. The selection is very often preceded by "Calls for expression of interest" in relation with a particular area which falls into the sponsor's domain of interest. The privileging of NGOs of the same nationality as the sponsor is based on the proximity of procedures, experience, logistical and relational capital, and the concern for "performance".

The case of Ivory Coast highlights the question of "emergency humanitarianism and its aftermath" (Mattei, 2005; Choumoff, 2011; Alagbe, 2013), with the absence of an approach emphasising local partnerships and a lack of sync in the sequences of deployment and retreat from the humanitarian field. In general, social interventions have been the subject of numerous anthropological studies (Blundo, 1996; Chauveau and Mathieu, 1998; Jacob, 2002, etc.). On the whole, they put forward the plurality of norms which lead to confusion and conflict (Lavigne Delville, 2011). This plurality of norms is mirrored by an institutional plurality which is loosely regulated, often more competitive than coordinated, which contributes to the politicisation of action and causes problems of governance (Chauveau et al. 2006, Le Meur 2006; Lavigne Delville, 2011). It follows that the humanitarian market is structured by the implementation of frameworks of reference and pooling such as the Central

Emergency Relief Fund (CERF), the SPHERE project, clusters, the institutionalisation of coordination by OCHA, etc., which have had divided success locally.

The case of Ivory Coast resonates with the determining factors of decision-making in humanitarian action, highlighted by Darcy et al (2013: 5), factors other than information and its analysis which influence decision-making. The ideology of the fear of dependency appears in this regard as one of these factors.

Whilst the Ivorian crisis was the catalyst for the explosion of local humanitarian actors, their capacity to ensure the hand-over when the emergency actors retreat remains problematic, and also raises the question of the dialogue between humanitarianism, peace-building and development.

The situation of local actors calls into question the indicators of the emergency, transition, and development phases, which still compartmentalise the deployment of humanitarian actors in a country like Ivory Coast. After the retreat of these international NGOs, the instability in terms of national capacities to respond to a humanitarian emergency or to development remains intact. Humanitarian transition has a tendency to follow comparators of the renewed capacity of the State, as well as the concern with avoiding humanitarian dependency. In this regard, a specific study of the modes of appropriation of skills, and especially of action skill bases, by these local non-state humanitarian actors, is worth undertaking. The risk of relapses, such as the 2010/2011 crisis, when the professionals had left the country, and the cobbling-together during the first months of the response, is a case in point. As is the cholera epidemic and its aggravation in the context of the local structures' fragility in the face of its advance in Liberia and Guinea. How will "top-down" humanitarian transition reconfigure the actors that emergency humanitarianism has conditioned? It remains to be seen how these local actors will transform, those who survive, and what mechanisms they will call upon faced with the reorganisation of donors and the local populations' demand.

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